Śūnyatā, which is translated into English as ‘emptiness,’ is the crux of what Nāgārjuna presents in his famous work Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. He devotes the first twenty-five of the total twenty-seven chapters of the text to a detailed explanation of śūnyatā.[1] Given Nāgārjuna’s position as a scholar in the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition, this focus of his text could be seen as a reflection of the emphasis that Mahāyāna places on the idea of emptiness.[2] The in-depth analysis of śūnyatā that Nāgārjuna presents is undoubtedly one of the most detailed theoretical explorations found in Buddhism.
In his first chapter, titled “Examination of Conditions,” Nāgārjuna discusses the cause-effect relationship as an empty duality. He first presents the simple assumption that a cause or condition bears that name because it leads to an effect (1.5).[3] Having established this duality, he explores the emptiness of it. He makes the point that a condition or cause is a condition only in relation to its effect, and, in the same way, an effect is an effect only in relation to its cause or condition. In a context where A is established as the condition of B, the condition-ness of A makes sense only to the extent that B is understood as the effect that arises out of A. In the same way, the effect-ness of B makes sense only to the extent that A is understood as the condition that gives rise to B. Each, in the capacity described, is in this sense crucial for the existence of the other. Taking his argument one step ahead, he questions the sense in which what is called the condition for a given effect could be understood as a condition, first in a context where the effect has not yet come into being and second in a context where the effect has already become an existent. In the first scenario, the condition is not a condition because there is nothing in relation to which its identity could be established as a condition. In the second scenario, the condition is not a condition because there is nothing about it that “conditions” the effect (any more). In this sense, they could rightfully be called the condition and the effect only at that moment when one is conditioning the other or one is in the process of being conditioned by the other.
Nevertheless, what Nāgārjuna says about the nature of the condition and the effect problematises even this fleeting moment of identity. According to him, the effect is not present in the condition, and he asks the question how what is not in the condition comes from that condition (1.11). This question challenges the perceived connection between a condition and an effect. In a context where both the condition-ness of the condition and the perceived connection between the condition and the effect are challenged, Nāgārjuna points to the logical possibility of the effect being perceived as arising out of a non-condition (1.12).
This idea of the non-condition could be understood in two ways: (1) as a condition other than what is associated with a given effect, and (2) as a “reality” external to the notion of conditions. The first understanding of the idea of the non-condition could be explained in the following manner: Although B is seen as the effect that arises out of the condition A, since B is distinct from A, and B is not present within A, the claim that B is the effect that has arisen out of the condition A points to a forced connection[4] between A and B. This recognition of the relationship between A and B more as a forced connection than as a natural one immediately problematises the condition-ness of A, thereby liberating B from its perceived relationship with A. This liberation enables B to be viewed as an effect that arises even out of a condition other than A, which represents either any part or the whole of the realm of conditions. The idea that B is capable of arising out of a condition that is either A or non-A dissolves the distinction between A and non-A. According to the second understanding of the idea of the non-condition, B could arise from a reality that is external to the domain that consists of A and non-A. The idea that B is capable of arising out of a non-condition or a “condition” that is external to the realm of conditions dissolves the distinction between conditions (the realm of conditions defined by A and non-A) and non-conditions (the “reality” external to the realm of conditions). The problematisation of the distinction between conditions and non-conditions indicates that the very notion of (non-)conditions is empty of its own being.
Having established the condition as something that is empty of its own being, Nāgārjuna proceeds to show what this emptiness of the conditions means for the effect. He argues that the effect, as something that has arisen from a condition, should embody the condition as its essence; however, given that the conditions themselves are devoid of any essence, the idea that the effect is an embodiment of a condition as its essence is problematic (1.14). If the conditions are essence-less what arises out of them is bound to be essence-less. In this sense, the effect is devoid of any essence; it is empty of its own being. The argument that both the conditions and the effect are empty of their own being collapses the distinction between the two. This collapse of distinction establishes that conditions and effects are nothing more than illusory constructs.
[1] David J. Kalupahana, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas Publishers [Pvt] Ltd., 1991), 77. Kalupahana shows how central śūnyatā is to Nāgārjuna’s discussion when he argues, “By the time he [any reader of the text] completed reading the first twenty-five chapters, wherein the conception of ‘emptiness’ (śūnyatā) occurs in almost every other verse, he would be imbued with that concept to such an extent that it would become a dogma, a dŗșți, rather than a mere method of analysis” (Kalupahana 77, emphasis in original).
[2] Donald W. Mitchell and Sarah H. Jacoby, Buddhism: Introducing teh Buddhist Experience, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014): 156. Mitchell and Jacoby observe, “Because in that work [Mūlamadhyamakakārikā] Nāgārjuna does not mention any Mahāyāna sūtras, nor does he even use the word Mahāyāna, some scholars have doubted that he was a Mahāyānist. However, his views are so close to those expressed in the Perfection of Wisdom Literature that most consider him part of the Mahāyāna movement” (156, emphasis in original).
[3] He says, “These are conditions, because depending upon them these [others] arise” (1.5). As far as the format of the parenthetical reference is concerned, the number left to the period indicates the chapter and the one to the right indicates the verse. All the parenthetical references to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā follow this format.
[4] I use the phrase ‘forced connection’ to signify an externally constructed relationship between two components that are not necessarily related.
In his first chapter, titled “Examination of Conditions,” Nāgārjuna discusses the cause-effect relationship as an empty duality. He first presents the simple assumption that a cause or condition bears that name because it leads to an effect (1.5).[3] Having established this duality, he explores the emptiness of it. He makes the point that a condition or cause is a condition only in relation to its effect, and, in the same way, an effect is an effect only in relation to its cause or condition. In a context where A is established as the condition of B, the condition-ness of A makes sense only to the extent that B is understood as the effect that arises out of A. In the same way, the effect-ness of B makes sense only to the extent that A is understood as the condition that gives rise to B. Each, in the capacity described, is in this sense crucial for the existence of the other. Taking his argument one step ahead, he questions the sense in which what is called the condition for a given effect could be understood as a condition, first in a context where the effect has not yet come into being and second in a context where the effect has already become an existent. In the first scenario, the condition is not a condition because there is nothing in relation to which its identity could be established as a condition. In the second scenario, the condition is not a condition because there is nothing about it that “conditions” the effect (any more). In this sense, they could rightfully be called the condition and the effect only at that moment when one is conditioning the other or one is in the process of being conditioned by the other.
Nevertheless, what Nāgārjuna says about the nature of the condition and the effect problematises even this fleeting moment of identity. According to him, the effect is not present in the condition, and he asks the question how what is not in the condition comes from that condition (1.11). This question challenges the perceived connection between a condition and an effect. In a context where both the condition-ness of the condition and the perceived connection between the condition and the effect are challenged, Nāgārjuna points to the logical possibility of the effect being perceived as arising out of a non-condition (1.12).
This idea of the non-condition could be understood in two ways: (1) as a condition other than what is associated with a given effect, and (2) as a “reality” external to the notion of conditions. The first understanding of the idea of the non-condition could be explained in the following manner: Although B is seen as the effect that arises out of the condition A, since B is distinct from A, and B is not present within A, the claim that B is the effect that has arisen out of the condition A points to a forced connection[4] between A and B. This recognition of the relationship between A and B more as a forced connection than as a natural one immediately problematises the condition-ness of A, thereby liberating B from its perceived relationship with A. This liberation enables B to be viewed as an effect that arises even out of a condition other than A, which represents either any part or the whole of the realm of conditions. The idea that B is capable of arising out of a condition that is either A or non-A dissolves the distinction between A and non-A. According to the second understanding of the idea of the non-condition, B could arise from a reality that is external to the domain that consists of A and non-A. The idea that B is capable of arising out of a non-condition or a “condition” that is external to the realm of conditions dissolves the distinction between conditions (the realm of conditions defined by A and non-A) and non-conditions (the “reality” external to the realm of conditions). The problematisation of the distinction between conditions and non-conditions indicates that the very notion of (non-)conditions is empty of its own being.
Having established the condition as something that is empty of its own being, Nāgārjuna proceeds to show what this emptiness of the conditions means for the effect. He argues that the effect, as something that has arisen from a condition, should embody the condition as its essence; however, given that the conditions themselves are devoid of any essence, the idea that the effect is an embodiment of a condition as its essence is problematic (1.14). If the conditions are essence-less what arises out of them is bound to be essence-less. In this sense, the effect is devoid of any essence; it is empty of its own being. The argument that both the conditions and the effect are empty of their own being collapses the distinction between the two. This collapse of distinction establishes that conditions and effects are nothing more than illusory constructs.
[1] David J. Kalupahana, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas Publishers [Pvt] Ltd., 1991), 77. Kalupahana shows how central śūnyatā is to Nāgārjuna’s discussion when he argues, “By the time he [any reader of the text] completed reading the first twenty-five chapters, wherein the conception of ‘emptiness’ (śūnyatā) occurs in almost every other verse, he would be imbued with that concept to such an extent that it would become a dogma, a dŗșți, rather than a mere method of analysis” (Kalupahana 77, emphasis in original).
[2] Donald W. Mitchell and Sarah H. Jacoby, Buddhism: Introducing teh Buddhist Experience, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014): 156. Mitchell and Jacoby observe, “Because in that work [Mūlamadhyamakakārikā] Nāgārjuna does not mention any Mahāyāna sūtras, nor does he even use the word Mahāyāna, some scholars have doubted that he was a Mahāyānist. However, his views are so close to those expressed in the Perfection of Wisdom Literature that most consider him part of the Mahāyāna movement” (156, emphasis in original).
[3] He says, “These are conditions, because depending upon them these [others] arise” (1.5). As far as the format of the parenthetical reference is concerned, the number left to the period indicates the chapter and the one to the right indicates the verse. All the parenthetical references to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā follow this format.
[4] I use the phrase ‘forced connection’ to signify an externally constructed relationship between two components that are not necessarily related.